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ENCLOSURE "A"

1. The recommendation of but four Central Committees is made only after careful consideration and in the belief that all subjects which may come up for study will properly and easily fit into the programs to be laid down under the general heads of (1) political, (2) economic, (3) military, and (4) scientific, in their broadest sense. Any further subdivisions, such as topographical, sociological, etc., will result in confusion and overlapping of these four basic divisions. Topography has political aspects such as frontiers; economic aspects such as natural resources and national self-sufficiency; and military aspects such as strategy. Sociology is equally of interest to at least three of the four basic divisions. As explained below, such overlapping topics could best be handled at a lower level than these basic committees, by joint subcommittees coordinated by the Central Committees.

2. Another reason for limiting the divisions to four is the belief that at this early stage in the development of central intelligence, the four agencies will undoubtedly be more capable of supplying four top flight men to represent them on these four committees than they would to man ten or twelve committees. These four will be able to provide from lower echelons personnel with proper qualifications to serve in the working groups. With an original limitation to four Central Committees, the present personnel of the Intelligence Branch of the Central Planning Staff can also supply proper C.I.G. representation in the Central Committees.

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3. Furthermore, it is considered wiser to start with a simple structure, letting experience guide its development, than to impose a more complicated division of subjects, which would be likely to lead to theoretical discussions, to consequent delays, and to difficulties and confusion in subsequent reorganization if the original structure is found unsuitable in practice.

4. Thus, it is intended that any one of the four Central Committees should feel free, after a period of operation and experience, to recommend that it be split into two or more basic Central Committees. The military committee may well come to the conclusion that it could better operate as two committees, one for naval matters and one for army matters. The political committee may equally find that personnel available, as well as subjects before it, recommend its division along some clear cut lines. But it must be emphasized that this prospective increase in the number of basic Central Committees would take place only at such time as practical experience has clearly established the need, and personnel with proper qualifications, both in the departments and in the Central Intelligence Group, are available.

5. In clear distinction, the Central Committees should at the start be invited to create joint subcommittees to work those fields having an interest to two or more of the Central Committees. The joint subcommittees would then cover their designated fields in all their aspects and make available to the several Central Committees the pertinent parts of their findings.

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